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Networked Control under Random and Malicious Packet Losses
Ahmet Cetinkaya, Hideaki Ishii, and Tomohisa Hayakawa
Abstract—We study cyber security issues in networked control
of a linear dynamical system. Specifically, the dynamical system
and the controller are assumed to be connected through a
communication channel that face malicious attacks as well as
random packet losses due to unreliability of transmissions. We
provide a probabilistic characterization for the link failures which
allows us to study combined effects of malicious and random
packet losses. We first investigate almost sure stabilization under
an event-triggered control law, where we utilize Lyapunov-like
functions to characterize the triggering times at which the plant
and the controller attempt to exchange state and control data over
the network. We then provide a look at the networked control
problem from the attacker’s perspective and explore malicious
attacks that cause instability. Finally, we demonstrate the efficacy
of our results with numerical examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security has become a critical problem in industrial
processes, since nowadays they incorporate information and
communication technologies that are prone to cyber threats.
Cyber attacks can disrupt the normal operation of services
that are critical to the society as they can cause financial
losses and environmental damages. It is thus essential to ensure
cyber security of existing infrastructures and design new cyber-
attack-resilient ones.
Literature on cyber security points out cyber threats against
industrial control systems utilized in many fields (see [1]
and the references therein). Vulnerabilities of the channels
used for transmission of measurement and control data pose
a critical issue for the security of control systems. This is
because the channels are recently connected via the Internet
or wireless communications [2], [3]. Communication channels,
for instance, may face jamming attacks initiated by malicious
agents [4], [5]. Such attacks block the communication link and
effectively prevent transmission of packets between the plant
and the controller. It is mentioned in [5] that jamming attacks
pose a major security threat, as they can be easily performed
with devices that target various wireless communication pro-
tocols. In recent works [6]–[13], networked control problems
under jamming attacks were investigated using control and/or
game-theoretic methods. However, jamming may not be the
only cause of malicious packet losses. Compromised routers
in a network may also intentionally drop packets [14], [15].
The work [16] explored the control problem over a multihop
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network with malicious nodes that intentionally stop forward-
ing packets or alter packet contents.
In addition to actions of malicious agents, state measure-
ment and control input packets may also fail to be transmitted
at times due to network congestion or errors in communication.
Stochastic models provide accurate characterization of such
nonmalicious network issues [17], [18]. In the literature, un-
reliability of a network is often characterized through random
models for packet loss events [19], [20]. For instance, in [21]–
[23], Bernoulli processes are used for modeling packet losses
in a network. Furthermore, in [24], [25], packet loss events are
characterized in a more general way by employing Markov
chains. In those studies, a variety of control methods are also
proposed to ensure stability of networked control systems that
face random packet losses.
In this paper, we propose a stochastic representation of
packet transmission failures in a network between a plant and
a controller. Our proposed model is sufficiently general and al-
lows us to explore some of the existing random and malicious
packet loss scenarios in a unified manner. At the core of this
characterization, we have a tail probability condition on the
average number of state measurement and control input packet
failures in the network. We demonstrate that random packet
losses, malicious attacks, as well as the combination of those
two phenomena satisfy the condition with different parameters.
We model random losses by using a binary-valued time-
inhomogeneous Markov chain. Furthermore, to characterize
malicious attacks, we use a model similar to the one in [10].
Specifically, this model allows attacks to happen arbitrarily
as long as the total number of packet exchange attempts that
face malicious attacks are almost surely bounded by a certain
ratio of the number of total packet exchange attempts between
the plant and the controller. The almost sure bound used in
our model in fact allows not only deterministic strategies but
also stochasticity in the generation of malicious attacks. As
a result, the model captures attacks that are generated based
on randomly varying information such as state and control
input or the random packet losses. Besides, an attacker may
also intentionally use randomness to imitate packet losses that
occur due to congestion or channel noise.
Through our malicious attack model, we consider scenarios
where the attacker targets the network only when the plant
and the controller attempt to exchange packets. In a jamming
attack scenario, our characterization, hence, can be considered
as a model for reactive jamming discussed in [4] for wireless
networks. The classification in [4] divides attackers into two
groups: active and reactive ones. An active jamming attacker
tries to block a communication channel regardless of whether
the channel is being used or not, whereas a reactive attacker
continuously monitors the channel and attacks only when there
is transmission. It is mentioned in [4] that it may be harder
2to detect a reactive jamming attacker as packets may also be
lost due to nonmalicious network issues and hence the reason
for packet losses may not be known with certainty. A similar
issue where packet losses occur due to both malicious and
nonmalicious reasons exists also in the context of multihop
networks. For instance [15] investigates combined effects of
malicious packet drops and nonmalicious channel errors.
Motivated by the scenarios mentioned above, we utilize
our probabilistic characterization also to investigate networks
that are subject to the combination of random transmission
errors due to unreliability of the channel and attacks conducted
by malicious agents. In our analysis, we consider two cases:
(i) when the attacks and random packet losses are modeled
as independent processes and (ii) when the attack strategy
is dependent on the random packet losses. The dependent
case is essential to model the situation where the attacker has
information of the random packet losses in the communication
channel and utilizes this information in the attack strategy.
Furthermore, we may also consider situations when the at-
tacker decides to attack based on the content of packets. In the
case of jamming attacks, this corresponds to selective jamming
discussed in [26], [27], where the intelligent jamming attacker
listens to the communication channel and decides whether to
interfere or not depending on the packet being transmitted.
For example, a jamming attacker may decide not to interfere
with the communication when the packet being transmitted is
already corrupted by channel noise. Moreover, in a network of
multiple nodes malicious ones may intentionally drop certain
packets based on their content [28]. The main theoretical
challenge in dealing with the combination of random packet
losses and malicious attacks stems from the fact that these two
phenomena are of different nature and hence have different
models. By utilizing a tail probability inequality for the
sum of processes that represent random packet losses and
malicious attacks, we show that our proposed probabilistic
characterization allows us to deal with both independent and
dependent loss cases.
By utilizing our probabilistic packet transmission model,
we investigate the networked control problem of a linear plant
through an event-triggered framework. Event-triggered control
methods have recently been employed in many studies (see
[29]–[31] and the references therein). We follow the approach
in [32], [33] and utilize Lyapunov-like functions to determine
the triggering times at which the plant and the controller
attempt to exchange state and control input information. The
triggering conditions that we propose ensure that the value
of a Lyapunov-like function of the state stays within certain
limits. Packet exchanges are attempted only before the value
of the Lyapunov-like function is predicted to exceed the limit.
In a successful packet exchange scenario, state measurements
are sent from the plant to the controller, which computes
a control input and sends it back to the plant. However,
state measurement or control input packets may fail to be
transmitted due to random packet losses and malicious attacks.
Our packet failure characterization and control system anal-
ysis differ from those of the recent studies [34]–[36], which
also investigate the event-triggered control problem under
packet losses. Specifically, in [34], the number of consecutive
packet losses is assumed to be upper-bounded, and a determin-
istic Lyapunov function approach is used for the closed-loop
stability analysis. Moreover, in [35], [36] the packet losses are
modeled by a Bernoulli process. The stability analysis in [36]
is based on investigating the evolution of the expectation of
a Lyapunov function. Despite the similarity to our malicious
attack model, our stability analysis also differs from that of
[10], where the analysis relies on a deterministic approach
for obtaining an exponentially decreasing upper bound for the
norm of the state. Our approach for stability analysis is related
to obtaining an upper bound on the top Lyapunov exponent
(see [37]–[39]) of the system and in that sense it is more
similar to the stability analysis conducted in [23], [40] for
networked systems without event-triggering. Specifically, we
find a stochastic upper bound for a Lyapunov-like function
and show that this stochastic upper bound tends to zero under
certain conditions indicating almost sure asymptotic stability.
In addition to stability analysis, we also address the question
of finding instability conditions under which the state of the
closed-loop system diverges almost surely. We observe that an
attack strategy that causes sufficiently frequent packet losses
can destabilize the closed-loop dynamics. This instability
result allows us to investigate effects of potential malicious
attacks on a networked control system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the networked control problem under random and
malicious packet losses. We present an event-triggered control
framework and provide sufficient conditions for almost sure
asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system in Section III.
In Section IV, we look at the networked problem from the
attacker’s perspective and provide conditions for instability
of the system. We present illustrative numerical examples in
Section V. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude the paper.
We note that part of the results in Sections II and III
appeared without proofs in our preliminary report [41]. Here,
we provide a more detailed discussion with complete proofs.
We use a fairly standard notation in the paper. Specifically,
we denote positive and nonnegative integers by N and N0,
respectively. Moreover, ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean vector norm
and ⌊·⌋ denotes the largest integer that is less than or equal
to its real argument. The notation P[·] denotes the probability
on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) with filtration {Fi}i∈N0 such
that Fi1 ⊂ Fi2 ⊂ F for i1, i2 ∈ N0 with i1 < i2.
II. NETWORKED CONTROL PROBLEM AND
CHARACTERIZATION OF NETWORK WITH RANDOM AND
MALICIOUS PACKET LOSSES
In this section we introduce the networked control problem
and present a characterization for a network with random
packet losses and those caused by malicious agents.
A. Networked Control System
Consider the linear dynamical system
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ N0, (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn and u(t) ∈ Rm denote the state and the
control input, respectively; furthermore,A ∈ Rn×n and Bn×m
are the state and input matrices, respectively.
3In our networked control problem, the plant and the con-
troller exchange information packets over a communication
channel to achieve stabilization of the zero solution x(t) ≡ 0.
We consider the case where packets are transmitted without
delay, but they may get lost. In a successful packet exchange
scenario, at a certain time instant, measured plant states are
transmitted to the controller, which generates a control input
signal and sends it to the plant. The transmitted control input
is applied at the plant side. In the case of an unsuccessful
packet exchange attempt, either the measured state packet
or the control input packet may get dropped, and in such
cases control input at the plant side is set to 0, which is
a common approach in the literature (e.g., [20], [24], [25],
[40]). In this setup, the plant is informed about a packet
exchange failure by the lack of an incoming control input.
Specific acknowledgement messages are thus not needed. This
allows the practical implementation by using a UDP-like
communication protocol discussed in [19].
We use τi ∈ N0, i ∈ N0, (with τi < τi+1) to denote the time
instants at which packet exchanges between the plant and the
controller are attempted. In this paper, we consider both the
case where packet exchanges are attempted at all time instants
and the case where an event-triggering mechanism decides the
successive packet exchange attempt times. In both cases, the
control input u(t) applied to the plant is given by
u(t) , (1− l(i))Kx(τi), t ∈ {τi, . . . , τi+1 − 1}, (2)
where K ∈ Rm×n denotes the feedback gain and {l(i) ∈
{0, 1}}i∈N0 is a binary-valued process that characterizes suc-
cess or failure of packet exchange attempts. When l(i) = 0,
the packet exchange attempt at time τi is successful and the
piecewise-constant control input at the plant side is set to
u(τi) = Kx(τi). On the other hand, l(i) = 1 indicates that
either the packet sent from the plant or the packet sent from the
controller is lost at time τi. Again, in such situations, control
input at the plant side is set to 0. We emphasize that the
framework described above allows us to deal with dropouts in
both state and control input channels of the network illustrated
in Fig. 1. In particular, the process l(·) is an overall indicator
of the packet exchange failures over these channels.
B. Network Characterization
Packet transmission failures in a network may have different
reasons. In what follows we characterize the effects of certain
stochastic and malicious packet loss models in a unified
manner by exploring dynamical evolution of the total number
of packet exchange failures.
First, we define a nonnegative integer-valued process
{L(k) ∈ N0}k∈N by
L(k) ,
k−1∑
i=0
l(i), k ∈ N. (3)
Note that L(k) denotes the total number of failed packet
exchange attempts during the time interval [0, τk−1], where
k attempts have been made.
In our packet loss model, we place a bound on the ratio of
failed attempts in a probabilistic and asymptotic sense.
Assumption 2.1: There exists a scalar ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that
∞∑
k=1
P[L(k) > ρk] <∞. (4)
The condition (4) provides a probabilistic characterization
of the evolution of the total number of packet exchange failures
through the scalar ρ ∈ [0, 1], representing their average ratio.
Note also that (4) describes a condition on the tail probability
P[L(k) > ρk] = P[L(k)
k
> ρ] of loss ratio L(k)
k
. This condition
is sufficiently general and includes some of the existing packet
loss models in the literature. We illustrate its generality by
establishing that condition (4) holds for four different cases:
1) random packet losses,
2) malicious packet losses,
3) combination of the two losses in 1) and 2) when they
are independent, and finally
4) combination but when they are dependent.
Note that for any packet loss model, Assumption 2.1 is trivially
satisfied with ρ = 1, since P[L(k) > k] = 0. On the other
hand, as we see below, for certain random and malicious
packet loss models, ρ can be obtained to be strictly smaller
than 1. A closely related characterization for packet dropouts
is presented in [23]; the scalar ρ in (4) corresponds to the
notion of dropout rate discussed there.
1) Random Packet Losses: To characterize nonmalicious
network issues such as packet drops due to network conges-
tion or communication errors, we utilize time-inhomogeneous
Markov chains. Specifically, let {lR(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 be
a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain adapted to filtration
{Fi}i∈N0 . Here, the σ-algebra Fi contains all random packet
transmission success/failure events for the first i + 1 packet
exchange attempt times {τ0, τ1, . . . , τi}. The Markov chain
{lR(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 is characterized by initial distributions
ϑq ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ {0, 1}, and time-varying transition probabili-
ties pq,r : N0 → [0, 1], q, r ∈ {0, 1}, such that
P[lR(0) = q] = ϑq,
P[lR(i+ 1) = r|lR(i) = q] = pq,r(i), i ∈ N0. (5)
The state lR(i) = 1 indicates that the network faces random
packet losses at time τi, and hence the packet exchange attempt
at τi results in failure. Here, success/failure of a packet ex-
change attempt depends on the states of the previous packet ex-
change attempts. Furthermore, transition probabilities between
success (lR(i) = 0) and failure (lR(i) = 1) states are time-
dependent. It is important to note that the time-inhomogeneous
Markov chain characterization with time-varying transition
probabilities allows us to take into account the variation in
the network between consecutive packet transmission instants.
Furthermore, this characterization generalizes the Bernoulli
and time-homogeneous Markov chain models that are often
used in the literature.
In what follows we show that Assumption 2.1 is satisfied
when the network faces random packet losses described by
time-inhomogeneous Markov chains. In characterization of
the scalar ρ used in Assumption 2.1 we use upper-bounds
4for transmission failure and success probabilities denoted
respectively by p1 ∈ [0, 1] and p0 ∈ [0, 1] such that
pq,1(i) ≤ p1, (6)
pq,0(i) ≤ p0, q ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N0. (7)
Note that even though pq,r(i) provide precise information
about the transitions between the states of random packet
losses, this information cannot be utilized when the network
faces the combination of malicious attacks and random packet
losses (discussed in Sections II-B3 and II-B4). In such cases,
information about the probability of malicious attacks for
each transmission attempt is not available, and as a result,
transition probabilities pq,r(i) for random packet losses cannot
be utilized to obtain the overall packet exchange failure
probabilities. On the other hand, we can employ the upper-
bounds p1 and p0 when we show that the overall packet
exchange failures satisfy Assumption 2.1.
Lemma 2.1: For the time-inhomogeneous process {lR(i) ∈
{0, 1}}i∈N0 with transmission failure probability upper-bound
p1 ∈ (0, 1) that satisfy (6), we have
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
i=0
lR(i) > ρRk] <∞, (8)
for all ρR ∈ (p1, 1).
Proof: We use Lemma A.1 in the Appendix to prove
this result. Specifically, let p˜ = p1, w˜ = 1, and define
the processes {ξ(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 and {χ(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0
with ξ(i) = lR(i) and χ(i) = 1, i ∈ N0. Since the
conditions in (67) and (68) are satisfied, it follows from
Lemma A.1 that P[
∑k−1
i=0 lR(i) > ρRk] ≤ ψk, where
ψk , φ
−ρRk+1 ((φ1−1)p1+1)k−1
(φ−1)p1 with φ ,
ρR(1−p1)
p1(1−ρR) , and∑∞
k=1 ψk <∞, which implies (8).
Lemma 2.1 indicates that when packet exchange failures
occur due to random packet losses (i.e., l(i) = lR(i)),
Assumption 2.1 holds for all ρ ∈ (p1, 1).
2) Packet Losses Due to Malicious Activity: Packet trans-
missions in a channel may get interrupted due to malicious
activities. For example, a compromised router in a network
may deny to forward incoming packets. In addition, packet
losses may also be caused by jamming attacks. A model for
the attack strategy of a malicious agent has been proposed in
[10]. In that study, the sum of the length of attack durations
is assumed to be bounded by a certain ratio of total time.
By following the approach of [10], let {lM(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0
denote the state of attacks. The state lM(i) = 1 indicates that
the packet transmission faces an attack at time τi. We consider
the case where the number of packet exchange attempts that
face attacks are upper bounded almost surely by a certain
ratio of the total number of packet exchange attempts, that
is, {lM(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 satisfies
P
[ k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) ≤ κ+ k
τ
]
= 1, k ∈ N, (9)
where κ ≥ 0 and τ > 1. In this characterization, among k
packet exchange attempts, at most κ+ k
τ
of them are affected
by attacks. Note that when κ = 0, (9) implies no attack in
the beginning: lM(i) = 0, i ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊τ⌋}, almost surely.
Scenarios that involve possible attacks during the first few
packet exchange attempts can be modeled by setting κ > 0.
In what follows, we would like to highlight the relations of
the malicious packet loss model in (9) to those in the literature.
First, since the attacks only happen at packet exchange attempt
instants, the characterization in (9) can be considered as a
reactive jamming model [4], where the attacker attacks the
channel only when there is a packet being transmitted. To
avoid being detected, an attacker may refrain from causing all
packets to be lost. The ratio 1
τ
in (9) characterizes the average
portion of the packet transmission attempts that face attacks.
Furthermore, in the case of jamming attacks, in addition to
avoid being detected, the attacker may also need to take into
account the energy requirements of jamming. The ratio 1
τ
in
this case corresponds to the notion jamming rate discussed in
[42], and it is related to the energy usage of the jammer.
Remark 2.2: A packet loss model that may be used to
capture behavior of an intelligent attacker is also discussed
in [21], where transmissions between the plant and the con-
troller are attempted at all time instants and the proposed
model allows packet losses to occur arbitrarily as long as
the lengths of intervals between consecutive successful packet
transmissions are not more than a given fixed length. A similar
model has also been used in [34], where an event-triggered
control method is used and the number of consecutive packet
losses is assumed to be upper-bounded by a constant. Note
that the packet loss model discussed in [21], [34] can be
described within the framework provided by (9) through
setting τ = s+1
s
, where s ≥ 1 denotes the upper-bound on
the number of consecutive packet losses. Under this setting,
the condition (9) provides more freedom to the attacker as
it does not necessarily require lengths of intervals between
consecutive successful packet transmission times to be upper-
bounded by a fixed constant. In fact for any τ > 1, (9) allows
the attacker to cause any number of consecutive packet losses
after waiting sufficiently long without attacking. Notice that
the number of consecutive packet losses is not restricted to be
bounded also in the case of random packet loss models (see
Section II-B1, as well as [20], [24], [43]).
As pointed out in [10], the condition (9) also shares some
similarities with the socalled average dwell time condition
[44] utilized in switched systems. In switched systems, the
average dwell time condition requires the number N(k2, k1)
of switches in between times k1 and k2 ≥ k1 to satisfy
N(k2, k1) ≤ κ+ k2 − k1
τ
, k2 ≥ k1 ≥ 0, (10)
where τ > 0 denotes the average dwell time. The inequality
(10) guarantees that the switches occur slowly on average. In
this study, we do not require a condition on the number of
switches between packet exchange success and failure states.
Rather than that we utilize (9), which is a condition on
the total number of packet exchange failures due to attacks.
The condition (9) guarantees that attacks happen rarely on
average. Note also that when N(k2, k1) is defined to denote
the number of packet exchange failures due to attacks over
all packet exchange attempts at times τk1 , τk1+1, . . . , τk2−1,
5(10) implies (9). Specifically, (10) reduces to (9) by setting
N(k2, k1) ,
∑k2−1
i=k1
lM(i), k1 = 0, and k2 = k.
As we have observed so far, the attack model in (9) is suffi-
ciently general to cover known models. We further generalize
it, because even though the model in (9) allows stochasticity in
the generation of lM(·), it is not enough to characterize certain
stochastic attacks. An example is the case where each packet
exchange attempt faces an attack with a fixed probability (e.g.,
{lM(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 is a Bernoulli process). To cover such
stochastic attacks as well as attacks characterized in (9), we
consider a model where {lM(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 is given through
conditions similar to (4). Specifically, we assume that there
exists a scalar ρM ∈ [0, 1] such that
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) > ρMk] <∞. (11)
The following lemma shows that the characterization with (11)
is more general than the one provided by (9).
Lemma 2.3: Suppose the binary-valued process {lM(i) ∈
{0, 1}}i∈N0 satisfies (9) with κ ≥ 0 and τ > 1. Then (11)
holds for all ρM ∈ ( 1τ , 1).
Proof: Using Markov’s inequality we obtain
P[
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) > ρMk] ≤ P[
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) ≥ ρMk]
= P[e
∑k−1
i=0 lM(i) ≥ eρMk] ≤ e−ρMkE[e
∑k−1
i=0 lM(i)] (12)
for k ∈ N. By (9), we have E[e
∑k−1
i=0 lM(i)] ≤ E[eκ+ kτ ] =
eκ+
k
τ
. Therefore, it follows from (12) that P[∑k−1i=0 lM(i) >
ρMk] ≤ eκ−(ρM− 1τ )k, k ∈ N. Thus, for all ρM ∈ ( 1τ , 1),
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) > ρMk] ≤
∞∑
k=1
eκ−(ρM−
1
τ
)k
= eκe−(ρM−
1
τ
)
(
1− e−(ρM− 1τ )
)−1
<∞,
which completes the proof.
Thus, if the only cause of packet losses is attacks (i.e., l(i) =
lM(i)), then Assumption 2.1 holds with ρ = ρM.
3) Combination of Random and Malicious Packet Losses
(independent case): In order to model the case where the
network is subject to both random and malicious packet losses,
we define {l(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 by
l(i) =
{
1, lR(i) = 1 or lM(i) = 1,
0, otherwise,
i ∈ N0, (13)
where {lR(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 is a time-inhomogeneous Markov
chain given in (5) characterizing random packet losses (from
Section II-B1) and {lM(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 satisfying (11) is a
binary-valued process that represents attacks of a malicious
agent (from Section II-B2).
Proposition 2.4 below provides a range of values for
ρ ∈ (0, 1) that satisfy Assumption 2.1 in the case where the
network faces both random and malicious packet losses.
Proposition 2.4: Consider the packet exchange failure in-
dicator process {l(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 given by (13) where
{lR(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 and {lM(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 are mutually
independent. Assume
p1 + p0ρM < 1, (14)
where p1, p0 ∈ (0, 1) are scalars that satisfy (6), (7). Then (4)
holds for all ρ ∈ (p1 + p0ρM, 1).
Proof: From (13), the overall loss process can be given
by
l(i) = lR(i) + (1− lR(i))lM(i), i ∈ N0,
and hence, by (3),
L(k) =
k−1∑
i=0
lR(i) +
k−1∑
i=0
(1− lR(i))lM(i), k ∈ N. (15)
Now, let ǫ , ρ − p1 − p0ρM, ǫ2 , min{ ǫ2 , ρM−p0ρM2 }, ǫ1 ,
ǫ− ǫ2, and define ρ1 , p1+ ǫ1, ρ2 , p0ρM+ ǫ2. Furthermore,
let L1(k) ,
∑k−1
i=0 lR(i) and L2(k) ,
∑k−1
i=0 (1− lR(i))lM(i).
We then have
P[L(k) > ρk] = P[L1(k) + L2(k) > ρ1k + ρ2k]
≤ P[{L1(k) > ρ1k} ∪ {L2(k) > ρ2k}]
≤ P[L1(k) > ρ1k] + P[L2(k) > ρ2k]. (16)
In the following we will show that the series
∑∞
k=1 P[L1(k) >
ρ1k] and
∑∞
k=1 P[L2(k) > ρ2k] are convergent.
First, note that
ρ1 = p1 + ǫ− ǫ2 = max{p1 + ǫ
2
, p1 + ǫ− ρM − p0ρM
2
}
= max{p1 + ρ− p0ρM
2
, ρ− p0ρM − ρM − p0ρM
2
}
= max{p1 + ρ− p0ρM
2
,
2ρ− ρM(1 + p0)
2
}. (17)
As p1+ρ−p0ρM2 < 1 and
2ρ−ρM(1+p0)
2 < 1, it holds from (17)
that ρ1 ∈ (p1, 1). Consequently,
∑∞
k=1 P[L1(k) > ρ1k] < ∞
follows from Lemma 2.1 with ρR replaced with ρ1.
Next, we will use Lemma A.1 to show that∑∞
k=1 P[L2(k) > ρ2k] < ∞. To obtain this result, we
first observe that ρ2 > p0ρM, since ǫ2 > 0. Moreover,
ρ2 = p0ρM +min{ ǫ
2
,
ρM − p0ρM
2
} ≤ p0ρM + ρM − p0ρM
2
< p0ρM + ρM − p0ρM = ρM,
and hence, we have ρ2 ∈ (p0ρM, ρM). As a consequence of
(9), conditions (67), (68) in the Lemma A.1 hold with p˜ = p0
and w˜ = ρM, together with processes {ξ(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0
and {χ(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 defined by setting ξ(i) = 1 − lR(i),
χ(i) = lM(i), i ∈ N0. Now, we have L2(k) =
∑k−1
i=0 ξ(i)χ(i)
and hence, Lemma A.1 implies
∑∞
k=1 P[L2(k) > ρ2k] <∞.
Finally, by (16), we arrive at
∞∑
k=1
P[L(k) > ρk]
≤
∞∑
k=1
P[L1(k) > ρ1k] +
∞∑
k=1
P[L2(k) > ρ2k] <∞,
which completes the proof.
64) Combination of Random and Malicious Packet Losses
(dependent case): So far, in Proposition 2.4, we assumed that
packet exchange attempt failures due to attacks are indepen-
dent of those due to random packet losses. Next, we consider
the case where the two processes {lR(i)}i∈N0 and {lM(i)}i∈N0
may be dependent. This is clearly the case when the attacker
has information of the random packet losses in the channel.
Furthermore, as we discussed in the Introduction, the attacker
may decide to attack based on the content of packets. In such
cases lM(·) would depend on state and control input, which in
turn depend on lR(·). Proposition 2.5 below deals with such
cases.
Proposition 2.5: Consider the packet exchange failure indi-
cator process {l(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0. Assume
p1 + ρM < 1, (18)
where p1 ∈ (0, 1) is a scalar that satisfies (6). Then (4) holds
for all ρ ∈ (p1 + ρM, 1).
Proof: It follows from (13) that
L(k) ≤
k−1∑
i=0
lR(i) +
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i), k ∈ N.
Now, using arguments similar to the ones used for obtaining
(16) in the proof of Proposition 2.4, we have
P[L(k) > ρk] ≤ P[
k−1∑
i=0
lR(i) +
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) > ρk]
≤ P[
k−1∑
i=0
lR(i) > ρ1k] + P[
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) > ρ2k], k ∈ N, (19)
and consequently
∞∑
k=1
P[L(k) > ρk]
≤
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
i=0
lR(i) > ρ1k] +
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) > ρ2k], (20)
where ρ1 , p1 + ǫ2 , ρ2 , ρM +
ǫ
2 , and ǫ , ρ− p1 − ρM.
Observe that ρ1 = p1 + ρ−p1−ρM2 =
ρ+p1−ρM
2 . Since
ρ+p1−ρM
2 < 1 and ǫ > 0, we have ρ1 ∈ (p1, 1). By using
Lemma 2.1 with ρR = ρ1, we obtain
∞∑
k=1
P[L1(k) > ρ1k] <∞. (21)
Furthermore, note that ρ2 = ρM+ ρ−p1−ρM2 =
ρ+ρM−p1
2 . Also,
by ρ+ρM−p12 < 1 and ǫ > 0, we have ρ2 ∈ (ρM, 1). Since
ρ2 > ρM, by the characterization of {lM(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 ,
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) > ρ2k] ≤
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
i=0
lM(i) > ρMk] <∞.
(22)
The result then follows from (20)–(22).
In comparison with Proposition 2.4, the result above pro-
vides a more restricted range of values for ρ that satisfies
Assumption 2.1. This is because in Proposition 2.5 we find
ρ for the worst case scenario where the attacker may be
knowledgeable about all random packet losses in the network
and may have access to the information of the transmitted state
and control input vectors. An example scenario is where the
attacker avoids placing malicious attacks when there is already
a random packet loss, increasing the total number of packet
exchange failures, which is clearly to the disadvantage of the
controller to maintain closed-loop stability.
We note that the condition (18) guarantees that the range
ρ ∈ (p1+ρM, 1) identified in Proposition 2.5 is well defined. If
p1+ρM ≥ 1, then Assumption 2.1 holds with ρ = 1. We also
note that Proposition 2.5 may introduce some conservativeness
when it is applied to other scenarios where malicious attacks
and random packet losses are dependent, but not as in the
worst case scenario mentioned above. In such cases additional
information about the malicious attacks and random packet
losses may be employed to show that Assumption 2.1 holds
with ρ < 1 even if p1 + ρM ≥ 1.
Remark 2.6: There may be situations where the attacker
has limited knowledge. For instance, the attacker may have
access only to certain entries of the state and control input
vectors. This situation arises in a multi-hop network with
multiple paths (see, e.g., [16], [45]); different parts of the
state and control input vectors may be sent over different paths
on the network and the attacker may have access to the data
only on some of those paths. In this case the attacker would
need an estimation mechanism to have information about
the state/control input vectors. Note that the operator may
also utilize encryption methods to prevent the attacker gain
any information about the system behavior. In the situations
where the attacker is not knowledgeable about the random
packet losses and has no information of state and control input
vectors, Proposition 2.4 can be used.
III. EVENT-TRIGGERED CONTROL DESIGN
In this section we investigate event-triggered control of (1)
over an unreliable and potentially attacked network character-
ized through Assumption 2.1.
As a first step, we introduce the event-triggering scheme
for communication between the plant and the controller. This
scheme will determine the time instants τi ∈ N0, i ∈ N0, at
which packet exchanges are attempted. For this purpose, we
utilize the quadratic Lyapunov-like function V : Rn → [0,∞)
given by V (x) , xTPx, where P > 0. Letting τ0 = 0, we
describe τi, i ∈ N, by
τi+1 , min
{
t ∈ {τi + 1, τi + 2, . . .} : t ≥ τi + θ
or V (Ax(t) +Bu(τi)) > βV (x(τi))
}
, (23)
where β ∈ (0, 1), θ ∈ N.
The triggering condition (23) involves two parts. The part
V (Ax(t)+Bu(τi)) > βV (x(τi)) ensures that after a success-
ful packet exchange attempt at τi, the value of V (·) stays
below the level βV (x(τi)) until the next packet exchange
attempt. Furthermore, the triggering condition t ≥ τi + θ
ensures that two consecutive packet exchange attempt instants
are at most θ ∈ N steps apart, that is, τi+1 − τi ≤ θ, i ∈ N0.
Although the specific value of θ does not affect the results
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developed below, the boundedness of packet exchange attempt
intervals guarantees that τi (and hence V (x(τi))) is well-
defined for each i ∈ N. In practice, the value of θ can be
selected considering how frequent the plant state is desired to
be monitored by the controller side.
The operation of the event-triggered networked control
system is illustrated in Fig. 1. The triggering condition (23)
is checked at the plant side at each step t ∈ N0. At times
t = τi, i ∈ N, the triggering condition is satisfied and packet
exchanges are attempted. In this example, a packet exchange
is attempted at time t = τ1, since V (Ax(t) + Bu(τ0)) >
βV (x(τ0)). At this time instant, the plant and the controller
successfully exchange state and control input packets over the
network, and as a result, control input on the plant side is
updated to Kx(τ1). Note that packet exchange attempts are
not always successful, and may fail due to loss of packets
in the network. In the figure, the packet exchange attempt at
time τ2 fails. In this case, it follows from (2) with l(2) = 1
that the control input at the plant side is set to 0 at time
τ2, which results in an unstable behavior. A packet exchange
is attempted again at the very next time step τ3, since the
triggering condition is also satisfied at that time instant.
A. Stability Analysis
Next, we investigate stability of the closed-loop event-
triggered networked control system (1), (2), (23), which is
a stochastic dynamical system due to the probabilistic char-
acterization of packet losses. Below we define almost sure
asymptotic stability for stochastic dynamical systems.
Definition 3.1: The zero solution x(t) ≡ 0 of the stochastic
system (1), (2), and (23) is almost surely stable if, for all
ǫ > 0 and p¯ > 0, there exists δ = δ(ǫ, p¯) > 0 such that if
‖x(0)‖ < δ, then
P[ sup
t∈N0
‖x(t)‖ > ǫ] < p¯. (24)
Moreover, the zero solution x(t) ≡ 0 is asymptotically stable
almost surely if it is almost surely stable and
P[ lim
t→∞ ‖x(t)‖ = 0] = 1. (25)
In our stability analysis for the networked control system
(1), (2), we utilize an upper bound for the long run average
of the total number of failed packet exchanges. The following
result is a direct consequence of the Borel-Cantelli lemma
(see [46]) and shows that under Assumption 2.1, the long run
average of the total number of failed packet exchanges is upper
bounded by ρ characterized in (4).
Lemma 3.2: If there exists a scalar ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that (4)
holds, then
lim sup
k→∞
L(k)
k
≤ ρ, (26)
almost surely.
In Propositions 2.4 and 2.5, we obtained a range of values
for ρ that satisfy (4). In those results the range was given as
an open interval. In the following result we show that when
Assumption 2.1 holds for a range of values, then (26) also
holds with ρ given as the infimum of the range.
Lemma 3.3: Suppose (4) is satisfied for all ρ ∈ (ρ, 1) where
ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then (26) holds with ρ = ρ, almost surely.
Proof: The proof resembles the sufficiency part of the
proof of Proposition 5.6 in [47]. First, by Lemma 3.2,
P[lim sup
k→∞
L(k)
k
− ρ > ǫ] = 0, (27)
for any ǫ > 0. Now, it follows from (27) that
P[lim sup
k→∞
L(k)
k
− ρ > 0] = P[∪∞j=1{lim sup
k→∞
L(k)
k
− ρ > 1
j
}]
≤
∞∑
j=1
P[lim sup
k→∞
L(k)
k
− ρ > 1
j
] = 0,
which implies that P[lim supk→∞
L(k)
k
≤ ρ] = 1.
Remark 3.4: Note that the term lim supk→∞
L(k)
k
in (26)
corresponds to the “discrete event rate” used in [48], [49] for
deterministic systems, when limk→∞ L(k)k exists. In this paper,
Assumption 2.1 allows the binary-valued process {l(i) ∈
{0, 1}}i∈N0 to be a non-ergodic stochastic process, for which
limk→∞
L(k)
k
may not be equal for all sample paths. For
instance, let l(i) , lM(i), i ∈ N0, and
lM(i) ,
{
1, i ∈ {α, 2α, 3α . . .},
0, otherwise,
where α : Ω → {2, 4} is a random variable with P[α = 2] =
P[α = 4] = 12 . In this setting, the attacker decides the period of
attacks based on a random variable α : Ω→ {2, 4}. Depending
on the value of α, malicious packet losses occur either at every
2 packet exchange attempts or at every 4 packet exchange
attempts. Thus, the discrete event rate would be a random
variable that depends on the value of α. On the other hand,
regardless of the value of α, (9) is satisfied with τ = 2, and
hence Lemmas 2.3 and 3.3 imply that lim supk→∞
L(k)
k
≤ 12 ,
almost surely. Note that here 12 represents the worst-case upper
bound for the long run average of the total number of failed
packet exchanges.
We are now ready to state the main result of this paper.
It provides a sufficient condition for almost sure asymptotic
8stability of the networked control system (1), (2) with packet
exchange failure indicator {l(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 satisfying (26).
Theorem 3.5: Consider the linear dynamical system (1).
Suppose that the process {l(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 characterizing
packet exchange failures1 in the network satisfies (26) with
scalar ρ ∈ [0, 1]. If there exist a matrix K ∈ Rm×n, a positive-
definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n, and scalars β ∈ (0, 1), ϕ ∈ [1,∞)
such that
(A+BK)T P (A+BK)− βP ≤ 0, (28)
ATPA− ϕP ≤ 0, (29)
(1− ρ) lnβ + ρ lnϕ < 0, (30)
then the event-triggered control law (2), (23) guarantees almost
sure asymptotic stability of the zero solution x(t) ≡ 0 of the
closed-loop system dynamics.
Proof: The proof is composed of three steps. In the initial
step, we obtain an inequality concerning the evolution of the
Lyapunov-like function V (x) , xTPx, x ∈ Rn. Then, we
will establish almost sure stability, and then finally we show
almost sure asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system.
First, we use (1) and (2) together with V (·) to obtain
V (x(τi + 1)) = x
T(τi) (A+ (1− l(i))BK)T P
· (A+ (1− l(i))BK)x(τi), i ∈ N0. (31)
Now, for the case l(i) = 0, (28) and (31) imply
V (x(τi + 1)) = x
T(τi) (A+BK)
T
P (A+BK)x(τi)
≤ βxT(τi)Px(τi). (32)
Since τi+1 ≥ τi + 1, it follows from (23) and (32) that
V (x(t)) ≤ βxT(τi)Px(τi)
= βV (x(τi)), t ∈ {τi + 1, . . . , τi+1}. (33)
On the other hand, for the case l(i) = 1, we have from (29)
and (31) that
V (x(τi + 1)) = x
T(τi)A
TPAx(τi) ≤ ϕxT(τi)Px(τi). (34)
Now if τi+1 = τi + 1, we have V (x(τi+1)) ≤ ϕV (x(τi)) due
to (34). Otherwise, that is, if τi+1 > τi + 1, it means that
V (x(t)) ≤ βV (x(τi)) for t ∈ {τi + 2, . . . , τi+1}. Therefore,
since β ≤ ϕ,
V (x(t)) ≤ ϕV (x(τi)), t ∈ {τi + 1, . . . , τi+1}. (35)
Using (33) and (35) we obtain
V (x(τi+1)) ≤ (1− l(i))βV (x(τi)) + l(i)ϕV (x(τi)), (36)
for i ∈ N0. Note that the inequality given in (36) provides an
upper bound on V (·).
Now, let η(k) ,
∏k−1
i=0 [(1− l(i))β + l(i)ϕ]. Then, by (36),
V (x(τk)) ≤ η(k)V (x(0)), k ∈ N. (37)
1We set (26) as a condition for packet exchange failures as it allows
more generality in comparison to Assumption 2.1. Note that by Lemma 3.2,
Assumption 2.1 implies (26). Furthermore, Lemma 3.3 shows that (26) also
holds when ρ is given as the infimum of an open interval where all values
satisfy Assumption 2.1.
Furthermore, since ln [(1 − q)β + qϕ] = (1 − q) lnβ + q lnϕ
for q ∈ {0, 1}, we have
ln η(k) =
k−1∑
i=0
ln [(1 − l(i))β + l(i)ϕ]
=
k−1∑
i=0
(1 − l(i)) lnβ +
k−1∑
i=0
l(i) lnϕ
= (k − L(k)) lnβ + L(k) lnϕ,
where L(k) =
∑k−1
i=0 l(i) by (3). Now by β ∈ (0, 1), and
ϕ ∈ [1,∞), it follows from (26) and (30) that
lim sup
k→∞
ln η(k)
k
= lim sup
k→∞
1
k
[(k − L(k)) lnβ + L(k) lnϕ]
≤ (1− ρ) lnβ + ρ lnϕ < 0,
almost surely. As a consequence, limk→∞ ln η(k) = −∞, and
hence, limk→∞ η(k) = 0, almost surely. Thus, for any ǫ > 0,
limj→∞ P[supk≥j η(k) > ǫ
2] = 0. Therefore, for any ǫ > 0
and p¯ > 0, there exists a positive integer N(ǫ, p¯) such that
P[sup
k≥j
η(k) > ǫ2] < p¯, j ≥ N(ǫ, p¯). (38)
In what follows, we employ (37) and (38) to show almost
sure stability of the closed-loop system. Note that (33), (35),
and ϕ ≥ 1 > β imply that V (x(t + 1)) ≤ ϕV (x(t)), t ∈
{τi, . . . , τi+1 − 1}, i ∈ N0. Since ‖x‖2 ≤ 1λmin(P )V (x) and
V (x) ≤ λmax(P )‖x‖2, x ∈ Rn, we have
‖x(t)‖2 ≤ ϕν‖x(τi)‖2, t ∈ {τi, . . . , τi+1 − 1} (39)
for i ∈ N0, where ν , λmax(P )λmin(P ) .
Now, let Tk , {τk, . . . , τk+1 − 1}, k ∈ N0. Then
by using (37) and (39), we obtain η(k) ≥ V (x(τk))
V (x(0)) ≥
λmin(P )
λmax(P )
‖x(τk)‖2
‖x(0)‖2 ≥ 1ν2ϕ ‖x(t)‖
2
‖x(0)‖2 for all t ∈ Tk, k ∈ N. Hence,
η(k) ≥ 1
ν2ϕ
maxt∈Tk ‖x(t)‖2
‖x(0)‖2 , k ∈ N. By (38), it follows that for
all ǫ > 0 and p¯ > 0,
P[sup
k≥j
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖ > ǫν√ϕ‖x(0)‖]
= P[sup
k≥j
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖2 > ǫ2ν2ϕ‖x(0)‖2]
= P[sup
k≥j
1
ν2ϕ
maxt∈Tk ‖x(t)‖2
‖x(0)‖2 > ǫ
2]
≤ P[sup
k≥j
η(k) > ǫ2] < p¯, j ≥ N(ǫ, p¯).
We now define δ1 , 1ν√ϕ . Note that if ‖x(0)‖ ≤ δ1, then
(since ν√ϕ‖x(0)‖ ≤ 1) for all j ≥ N(ǫ, p¯), we have
P[sup
k≥j
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖ > ǫ]
≤ P[sup
k≥j
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖ > ǫν√ϕ‖x(0)‖] < p¯. (40)
On the other hand, since ϕ ≥ 1 > β, it follows from
(36) that V (x(τk)) ≤ ϕkV (x(0)) ≤ ϕN(ǫ,p¯)−1V (x(0)) for
all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N(ǫ, p¯) − 1}. Therefore, ‖x(τk)‖2 ≤
9ϕN(ǫ,p¯)−1 λmax(P )
λmin(P )
‖x(0)‖2 = ϕN(ǫ,p¯)−1ν‖x(0)‖2. Further-
more, as a result of (39),
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖2 ≤ ϕν‖x(τk)‖2 ≤ ν2ϕN(ǫ,p¯)‖x(0)‖2,
and hence, maxt∈Tk ‖x(t)‖ ≤ ν
√
ϕN(ǫ,p¯)‖x(0)‖ for all
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N(ǫ, p¯) − 1}. Let δ2 , ǫν−1
√
ϕ−N(ǫ,p¯).
Now, if ‖x(0)‖ ≤ δ2, then maxt∈Tk ‖x(t)‖ ≤ ǫ, k ∈
{0, 1, . . . , N(ǫ, p¯)− 1}, which implies
P[ max
k∈{0,1,...,N(ǫ,p¯)}
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖ > ǫ] = 0. (41)
It follows from (40) and (41) that for all ǫ > 0, p¯ > 0,
P[ sup
t∈N0
‖x(t)‖ > ǫ] = P[ sup
k∈N0
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖ > ǫ]
= P[{ max
k∈{0,1,...,N(ǫ,p¯)−1}
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖ > ǫ}
∪ { sup
k≥N(ǫ,p¯)
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖ > ǫ}]
≤ P[ max
k∈{0,1,...,N(ǫ,p¯)−1}
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖ > ǫ]
+ P[ sup
k≥N(ǫ,p¯)
max
t∈Tk
‖x(t)‖ > ǫ] < p¯,
whenever ‖x(0)‖ < δ , min(δ1, δ2), which implies almost
sure stability.
Finally, in order to establish almost sure asymptotic stability
of the zero solution, it remains to show (25). To this end,
observe that P[limk→∞ η(τk) = 0] = 1. It follows from (37)
that P[limk→∞ V (x(τk)) = 0] = 1, which implies (25). Hence
the zero solution of the closed-loop system (1), (2), (23) is
asymptotically stable almost surely.
Theorem 3.5 provides a sufficient condition under which
the event-triggered control law (2), (23) guarantees almost
sure asymptotic stability of the system (1) for the case of
packet losses satisfying Assumption 2.1. Note that the scalars
β ∈ (0, 1) and ϕ ∈ [1,∞) in conditions (28) and (29)
characterize upper bounds on the growth of the Lyapunov-
like function, and they are also related to closed-loop and
open-loop bounds utilized in [36], [40]. Specifically, when a
packet exchange attempt between the plant and the controller
is successful at time τi, the condition (28) together with (23)
guarantees that V (x(τi+1)) ≤ βV (x(τi)). On the other hand,
if a packet exchange is unsuccessful at time τi, it follows from
(23) and (29) that V (x(τi+1)) ≤ ϕV (x(τi)). If successful
packet exchanges are sufficiently frequent such that (30) is
satisfied, then the closed-loop stability is guaranteed.
We remark that the analysis for the closed-loop system
stability in the proof above is technically involved partly
due to the general characterization in Assumption 2.1, which
captures not only random packet losses but attacks as well.
If we consider only random packet losses, we may employ
methods from discrete-time Markov jump systems theory [50]
for obtaining conditions of stability. Furthermore, in the case
{l(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 is an ergodic process, the results presented
in [40] can be directly employed to show stability.
On the other hand packet losses due to attacks (Sec-
tion II-B2) cannot be described using Markov processes and
they may not be ergodic. Stability of a system under denial-
of-service attacks is explored in [10], where the analysis relies
on a deterministic approach for obtaining an exponentially
decreasing upper bound for the norm of the state. In contrast,
in our analysis, we use probabilistic approaches similar to [23],
[40] to show almost sure asymptotic stability. Specifically, we
use tools from probability theory to find a stochastic upper
bound for a Lyapunov-like function and show that this bound
tends to zero even though it may increase at certain times.
This approach is related to obtaining an upper bound on the
top Lyapunov exponent (see [37]–[39]) of a stochastic system.
Theorem 3.5 provides conditions that guarantee both (24)
and (25) implying almost sure asymptotic stability. In this
stability definition, (25) is concerned with the convergence of
solutions to zero, while (24) ensures that states sufficiently
close to the origin are likely to stay close to the origin.
However note that (24) allows states to leave any given ball
in a finite time with positive (even if small) probability. For
instance, if many consecutive packet transmission attempts
fail, the state magnitude may grow due to lack of control
action. We emphasize that Assumption 2.1 and hence (26)
ensure packet failures to be statistically rare so that the state
eventually converges to the origin.
Remark 3.6: In addition to almost sure stability, there
are other stochastic stability and performance notions that
are useful for the analysis of networked control systems. In
particular, moment stability and moment-based performance
notions have been utilized when random packet losses are
considered (see [19], [20] and the references therein). In
comparison with those works, in our problem setting, we must
take into account also the effect of malicious attacks. We
remark that in contrast with random packet losses, precise
information of the probabilities of malicious attacks is not
available. Hence, it is difficult to characterize the evolution
of the moments of the state and establish moment stability.
On the other hand, both random packet losses and malicious
attacks, as well as their combination provide us information
about the asymptotic ratio of packet exchange failures, which
can be employed in the analysis when we consider almost sure
asymptotic stability.
In the following corollary of Theorem 3.5, we discuss the
special case of random packet losses described with time-
homogeneous Markov chains.
Corollary 3.7: Consider the linear dynamical system (1).
Suppose that the process {l(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 is an irreducible
time-homogeneous Markov chain with constant transition
probabilities pq,r ∈ [0, 1], q, r ∈ {0, 1}. If there exist a matrix
K ∈ Rm×n, a positive-definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n, and scalars
β ∈ (0, 1), ϕ ∈ [1,∞) such that (28), (29) and (30) hold
with ρ , p0,1
p0,1+p1,0
, then the event-triggered control law (2),
(23) guarantees almost sure asymptotic stability of the zero
solution x(t) ≡ 0 of the closed-loop system dynamics.
Proof: By the ergodic theorem for irreducible Markov
chains [51], we have limk→∞ L(k)k = ρ. Now, since (26) holds,
the result follows from Theorem 3.5.
When we consider transmission attempts at all times by
setting θ = 1 in (23), Corollary 3.7 recovers a specialization
of the result in [40] for linear systems. Furthermore, if we
consider {l(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 to be a Bernoulli process, then
ρ in Corollary 3.7 is given by ρ = p, where p = p0,1 =
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p1,1 denotes the packet loss probability. In this setting, the
almost sure stability condition in Corollary 3.7 is tighter than
the second-moment stability condition in [36]. Specifically,
for this problem setting, the results in [36] can be used to
obtain the second-moment stability condition (1−ρ)β+ρϕ <
1 or equivalently ln[(1 − ρ)β + ρϕ] < 0. In comparison to
this condition, the stability condition (30) in Corollary 3.7 is
tighter. This is because (1−ρ) ln β+ρ lnϕ < ln[(1−ρ)β+ρϕ]
by Jensen’s inequality, since β < ϕ and ρ /∈ {0, 1}.
B. Feedback Gain Design for Event-Triggered Control
In the following, we outline a numerical method for de-
signing the feedback gain K ∈ Rm×n, as well as the positive-
definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n and the scalar β ∈ (0, 1) used in
the event-triggered control law (2), (23).
Corollary 3.8: Consider the linear dynamical system (1).
Suppose that the process {l(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 characterizing
packet exchange failures in the network satisfies (26) with
scalar ρ ∈ [0, 1]. If there exist a matrix M ∈ Rm×n, a positive-
definite matrix Q ∈ Rn×n, and scalars β ∈ (0, 1), ϕ ∈ [1,∞)
such that (30),[
βQ (AQ +BM)
T
AQ+BM Q
]
≥ 0, (42)[
ϕQ (AQ)T
AQ Q
]
≥ 0, (43)
hold, then the event-triggered control law (2), (23) with
P , Q−1 and K ,MQ−1 guarantees almost sure asymptotic
stability of the zero solution x(t) ≡ 0 of the closed-loop
system dynamics.
Proof: Using Schur complements (see [52]), we transform
(42) and (43), respectively, into
βQ− (AQ +BM)TQ−1 (AQ+BM) ≥ 0, (44)
ϕQ − (AQ)TQ−1AQ ≥ 0. (45)
By multiplying both sides of (44) and (45) from left and right
by Q−1, we obtain (28) and (29) with P = Q−1 and K =
MQ−1. Thus, the result follows from Theorem 3.5.
We remark that the matrix inequalities (42) and (43) are
linear in M ∈ Rm×n and Q ∈ Rn×n for fixed β ∈ (0, 1)
and ϕ ∈ [1,∞). In our method we seek feasible solutions M
and Q for linear matrix inequalities (42) and (43) by iterating
over a set of values for β ∈ (0, 1) and ϕ ∈ [1,∞) restricted
by the condition (30). It is however noted that we do not need
to search β and ϕ in the entire range characterized by (30).
It turns out to be sufficient to check for larger values of β
and ϕ that are close to the boundary of the range identified by
(1−ρ) lnβ+ρ lnϕ = 0. Specifically, we set ∆ > 0 as a small
positive real number, and then we iterate over a set of values
for β in the range (0, e−
∆
1−ρ ] to look for feasible solutions
M and Q for the linear matrix inequalities (42) and (43) with
ϕ = e−
(1−ρ) ln β+∆
ρ
. In this approach, we use only β ∈ (0, 1),
ϕ ∈ [1,∞) that are on the curve (1− ρ) lnβ + ρ lnϕ = −∆.
We illustrate this curve with the solid red line in Fig. 2, where
the shaded region corresponds to β and ϕ that satisfy (30).
Note that picking smaller values for ∆ > 0 moves the curve
towards the boundary. Also, there is no conservatism in not
considering β and ϕ such that (1 − ρ) lnβ + ρ lnϕ < −∆.
This is because if there exist M and Q that satisfy (42) and
(43) for values β = β˜ and ϕ = ϕ˜, then the same M and Q
satisfy (42) and (43) also for larger values β > β˜ and ϕ > ϕ˜.
IV. ATTACKER’S PERSPECTIVE
In order to design cyber-secure control systems, it is es-
sential to understand the risks in networked operation. In this
regard, it may be useful to consider the control problem from
the perspective of an attacker. An attacker knowledgeable
about the networked control system may generate an attack
strategy that causes sufficiently frequent packet losses which
can result in instability of the closed-loop dynamics. However,
the attacker may want to keep the number of attacks as small
as possible. One reason in the case of jamming attacks is
that monitoring the channel and producing jamming signals
consume energy [4]. Moreover, the attacks should be kept
minimal to make them less detectable by the system operators.
In this section, we address the question of finding con-
ditions under which the state diverges almost surely (i.e.,
P[limt→∞ ‖x(t)‖ = ∞] = 1). For the discussions and results
presented in this section, we consider the case where the plant
and the controller attempt to exchange packets at all time
instants, that is, τi = i, i ∈ N0. In the event-triggered scheme,
this corresponds to the case with θ = 1 in (23).
First, we obtain a lower-bound for the long run average
number of packet exchange failures by utilizing a characteri-
zation that is complementary to (4) in Assumption 2.1.
Lemma 4.1: If there exists a scalar σ ∈ [0, 1] such that
∞∑
k=1
P[L(k) < σk] <∞, (46)
where L(k) ,
∑k−1
i=0 l(t), k ∈ N, then
lim inf
k→∞
L(k)
k
≥ σ, (47)
almost surely.
Proof: Using (46), we obtain ∑∞k=1 P[∑k−1t=0 (1− l(t)) >
(1−σ)k] <∞, and hence, by Borel-Cantelli lemma (see [46]),
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
(1− l(t)) ≤ 1− σ, (48)
almost surely. Noting that lim supk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
t=0 (1 − l(t)) =
1− lim infk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
t=0 l(t), we obtain (47) from (48).
The inequality (46) can be considered as a complementary
characterization to (4) in Assumption 2.1. Observe that by
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Lemma 3.2, ρ ∈ [0, 1] in (4) characterizes an upper-bound on
the long run average number of packet exchange failures. In
comparison, as implied by (47), the scalar σ ∈ [0, 1] in (46)
provides a lower-bound on the long run average number of
packet exchange failures.
Notice that a large σ ∈ [0, 1] in (47) indicates that due to
random losses and malicious attacks, packet exchange failures
happen statistically frequently. In such cases, the overall
dynamics may become unstable. As mentioned earlier, since
malicious attacks often consume energy, the attacker would
want to disrupt normal operation and cause unstable behavior
with a fewer number of attacks. In the case of jamming attacks,
recent works considered game-theoretic methods to investigate
the optimal strategy of an attacker when the jamming energy
is a constraint in the problem [13] and when it is part of the
attacker’s cost function [12], [53]. The results obtained there
are not directly applicable here, as we investigate sufficient
attack rates that cause divergence of the state rather than
finding optimal attack strategies.
Our next result indicates how frequently the attacker should
cause packet exchange failures to induce instability.
Theorem 4.2: Consider the linear networked control system
(1), (2) where packet exchanges between the plant and the
controller are attempted at all time instants. Suppose that the
process {l(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 characterizing packet exchange
failures in the network satisfies (47) with σ ∈ [0, 1]. If there
exist a positive-definite matrix Pˆ ∈ Rn×n and scalars βˆ ∈
(0, 1), ϕˆ ∈ [1,∞) such that
(A+BK)
T
Pˆ (A+BK)− βˆPˆ ≥ 0, (49)
ATPˆA− ϕˆPˆ ≥ 0, (50)
(1− σ) ln βˆ + σ ln ϕˆ > 0, (51)
then limt→∞ ‖x(t)‖ =∞, almost surely.
Proof: Consider the Lyapunov-like function V (·) given
by V (x) , xTPˆ x, x ∈ Rn. For the case τi = i, i ∈ N0, by
(1), (2), we have
V (x(t+ 1)) = xT(t) (A+ (1− l(t))BK)T Pˆ
· (A+ (1− l(t))BK)x(t), t ∈ N0. (52)
From (49), (50), and (52), this can be bounded by
V (x(t+ 1)) ≥ (1− l(t))βˆV (x(t)) + l(t)ϕˆV (x(t)) (53)
for t ∈ N0. Now, let η(k) ,
∏k−1
t=0
(
(1− l(t))βˆ + l(t)ϕˆ
)
. It
follows from (53) that
V (x(k)) ≥ η(k)V (x(0)) (54)
for k ∈ N. Furthermore, since ln
[
(1 − q)βˆ + qϕˆ
]
= (1 −
q) ln βˆ + q ln ϕˆ for q ∈ {0, 1}, we have
ln η(k) =
k−1∑
t=0
(1− l(t)) ln βˆ +
k−1∑
t=0
l(t) ln ϕˆ
Now since βˆ ∈ (0, 1), we have ln βˆ < 0, and hence by (47),
lim inf
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
(1 − l(t)) ln βˆ = (ln βˆ) lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
(1− l(t))
= (ln βˆ)(1 − lim inf
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
l(t)) ≥ (ln βˆ)(1− σ).
Furthermore, since ln ϕˆ ≥ 0, it follows from (47) that
lim infk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
t=0 l(t) ln ϕˆ ≥ σ ln ϕˆ. Consequently, by (51),
lim inf
k→∞
ln η(k)
k
≥ lim inf
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
(1− l(t)) ln βˆ
+ lim inf
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
l(t) ln ϕˆ ≥ (1− σ) ln βˆ + σ ln ϕˆ > 0,
almost surely. As a consequence, limk→∞ ln η(k) = ∞, and
hence, limk→∞ η(k) = ∞, almost surely. Thus, it follows
from (54) that P[limt→∞ V (x(t)) = ∞] = 1, which implies
that limt→∞ ‖x(t)‖ =∞, almost surely.
Theorem 4.2 provides sufficient conditions (49)–(51) to
assess instability of the closed-loop system (1), (2). These
conditions are complementary to the stability conditions (28)–
(30) in Theorem 3.5. This point is further illustrated by
focusing on the scalar systems case.
Example 4.3: Consider the scalar system (1) with A,B ∈ R.
Then, conditions (49), (50) as well as (28), (29) can be satisfied
by Pˆ = P = 1, βˆ = β = (A + BK)2, and ϕˆ = ϕ = A2.
Now, if limk→∞ L(k)k exists and is a fixed constant, we can set
σ = ρ = limk→∞
L(k)
k
in (30) and (51) to obtain the stability
condition
(1− lim
k→∞
L(k)
k
)(A+BK)2 + lim
k→∞
L(k)
k
A2 < 0, (55)
and the instability condition
(1− lim
k→∞
L(k)
k
)(A+BK)2 + lim
k→∞
L(k)
k
A2 > 0. (56)
The limit limk→∞ L(k)k is a fixed constant for example when
the packet losses are Bernoulli-type or periodic. In those cases,
(55) and (56) indicate that Theorems 3.5 and 4.2 provide
tight stability/instability conditions for scalar systems. On the
other hand, for multi-dimensional systems, scalars β and βˆ
as well as ϕ and ϕˆ may not always be selected equal to
obtain tight results. Furthermore, under random packet losses
and malicious attacks, limk→∞ L(k)k may not always exist and
hence there may be a discrepancy between ρ and σ in (26)
and (47).
Proposition 4.4 below provides a range of values for σ that
satisfy (46) in the case where the network faces random and
malicious packet losses.
Proposition 4.4: Consider the packet exchange failure in-
dicator process {l(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 given by (13) where
{lR(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 and {lM(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 are mutually
independent. Suppose there exists σM ∈ (0, 1) such that
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
t=0
lM(t) < σMk] <∞. (57)
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Furthermore, suppose {lR(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 satisfies (7) with
p0 ∈ (0, 1). Then (46) holds for all σ ∈ (0, 1− p0(1 − σM)).
Proof: First, by using (13), we obtain
P[
k−1∑
t=0
l(t) < σk] = P[
k−1∑
t=0
(1 − l(t)) > (1 − σ)k]
= P[
k−1∑
t=0
(1− lR(t))(1 − lM(t)) > (1 − σ)k], k ∈ N. (58)
Furthermore, it follows from (57) that ∑∞k=1 P[∑k−1t=0 (1 −
lM(t)) > (1 − σM)k] =
∑∞
k=1 P[
∑k−1
t=0 lM(i) < σMk] < ∞.
Hence, {χ(i) , {0, 1}}i∈N0 defined by χ(i) = 1− lM(i), i ∈
N0, satisfies (68) with w˜ = 1 − σM < 1. Furthermore,
{ξ(i) , {0, 1}}i∈N0 defined by ξ(i) = 1 − lR(i), i ∈ N0,
satisfies (67) with p˜ = p0 ∈ (0, 1). We then have from
Lemma A.1 that
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
t=0
(1 − lR(t))(1 − lM(t)) > ̺k] <∞, (59)
for all ̺ ∈ (p0(1− σM), 1− σM).
In the rest of the proof, we will show that (59) holds also
for ̺ ∈ [1 − σM, 1). To this end, let ̺′ , p0(1−σM)+1−σM2 .
Since ̺′ ∈ (p0(1 − σM), 1 − σM), by (59), we get λ ,∑∞
k=1 P[
∑k−1
t=0 (1 − lR(t))(1 − lM(t)) > ̺′k] < ∞. Further-
more, for all ̺ ∈ [1− σM, 1) we have ̺ ≥ ̺′ and hence
P[
k−1∑
t=0
(1− lR(t))(1 − lM(t)) > ̺k]
≤ P[
k−1∑
t=0
(1− lR(t))(1 − lM(t)) > ̺′k], k ∈ N.
Thus, for ̺ ∈ [1 − σM, 1),
∑∞
k=1 P[
∑k−1
t=0 (1 − lR(t))(1 −
lM(t)) > ̺k] ≤ λ < ∞. Therefore, (59) holds for all ̺ ∈
(p0(1− σM), 1) = (p0(1− σM), 1− σM) ∪ [1− σM, 1). Now
since σ = 1 − ̺, it follows from (58) that (46) holds for all
σ ∈ (0, 1− p0(1− σM)).
Proposition 4.4 shows that when malicious attacks are
independent of the random losses and they satisfy (57), the
inequalities (46) and (47) (due to Lemma 4.1) hold for a range
of values of σ. This result indicates the effects of independent
random packet losses and malicious attacks on the asymptotic
ratio of packet exchange attempt failures over all attempts.
The next result is concerned with the scenarios where
random packet losses and malicious attacks need not be
independent.
Proposition 4.5: Consider the packet exchange failure indi-
cator process {l(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 given by (13). Suppose there
exists σM ∈ (0, 1) such that (57) holds. Furthermore, suppose
{lR(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 satisfies (7) with p0 ∈ (0, 1). Then (46)
holds for all σ ∈ (0,max{1− p0, σM}).
Proof: We will show that (46) holds for the cases: 1)
max{1− p0, σM} = 1 − p0 and 2) max{1 − p0, σM} = σM.
First, if max{1 − p0, σM} = 1 − p0, then noting that∑k−1
t=0 lR(t) ≤
∑k−1
t=0 l(t), we obtain
P[
k−1∑
t=0
l(t) < σk] = P[
k−1∑
t=0
(1− l(t)) > (1− σ)k]
≤ P[
k−1∑
t=0
(1− lR(t)) > (1− σ)k], (60)
for k ∈ N. Now, {χ(i) , {0, 1}}i∈N0 with χ(i) = 1, i ∈ N0,
satisfies (68) with w˜ = 1. Furthermore, {ξ(i) , {0, 1}}i∈N0
with ξ(i) = 1 − lR(i), i ∈ N0, satisfies (67) with p˜ = p0 ∈
(0, 1). Since 1 − σ > p0, we have from Lemma A.1 that∑∞
k=1 P[
∑k−1
t=0 (1− lR(t)) > (1− σ)k] <∞. Hence, by (60),
we have (46).
Next, if max{1−p0, σM} = σM, then since
∑k−1
t=0 lM(t) ≤∑k−1
t=0 l(t) and σ < σM, we get
P[
k−1∑
t=0
l(t) < σk] ≤ P[
k−1∑
t=0
lM(t) < σMk], k ∈ N. (61)
Consequently, (57) and (61) imply (46).
Proposition 4.5 provides a range for σ in (46) when we
consider the case where random packet losses and malicious
attacks may be dependent. This range is smaller in comparison
to the one provided in Proposition 4.4 for the independent case.
This is because Proposition 4.5 deals with scenarios including
the worst case from the perspective of the attacker. In that sce-
nario, the malicious attacks and random packet losses happen
at the same time instants, and hence, the statistical frequency
of the overall packet exchange failures cannot exceed the
maximum of the frequencies of malicious attacks and random
packet losses. We remark that there are other scenarios where
the attacks depend on the random packet losses. For instance,
the attacker may intentionally avoid attacking when there is
already a random packet loss. This scenario is characterized
in the mathematical setting by lR(t)lM(t) = 0, t ∈ N0. For
this scenario, the following proposition provides a range of σ
that satisfy (46).
Proposition 4.6: Consider the packet exchange failure in-
dicator process {l(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 given by (13). Suppose
{lR(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 satisfies (7) with p0 ∈ (0, 1). Further-
more, suppose lR(t)lM(t) = 0, t ∈ N0, and there exists
σM ∈ (0, 1) such that (57) holds. If 1 − p0 + σM ≤ 1, then
(46) holds for all σ ∈ (0, 1− p0 + σM).
Proof: First let ǫ , 1 − p0 + σM − σ, and define σ1 ,
max{0, 1−p0− ǫ2}, σ2 , max{0, σM− ǫ2}. Note that σ1+σ2 ≥
σ. Now since lR(t)lM(t) = 0, t ∈ N0, we have from (13) that∑k−1
t=0 l(t) =
∑k−1
t=0 lR(t) +
∑k−1
t=0 lM(t). As a result
P[
k−1∑
t=0
l(t) < σk] = P[
k−1∑
t=0
lR(t) +
k−1∑
t=0
lM(t) < σk]
≤ P[
k−1∑
t=0
lR(t) +
k−1∑
t=0
lM(t) < σ1k + σ2k]
≤ P[
k−1∑
t=0
lR(t) < σ1k] + P[
k−1∑
t=0
lM(t) < σ2k], k ∈ N. (62)
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If σ1 = 0, then P[
∑k−1
t=0 lR(t) < σ1k] = 0, and hence∑∞
k=1 P[
∑k−1
t=0 lR(t) < σ1k] = 0 < ∞. If, on the other
hand, σ1 > 0, then we can utilize Lemma A.1. Specifically,
{χ(i) , {0, 1}}i∈N0 with χ(i) = 1, i ∈ N0, satisfies
(68) with w˜ = 1. Furthermore, {ξ(i) , {0, 1}}i∈N0 with
ξ(i) = 1 − lR(i), i ∈ N0, satisfies (67) with p˜ = p0 ∈ (0, 1).
Since σ1 > 0, it means that σ1 = 1−p0− ǫ2 . Now, since ǫ > 0,
we have (1 − σ1) ∈ (p0, 1). Consequently, we obtain from
Lemma A.1 that
∑∞
k=1 P[
∑k−1
t=0 (1−lR(t)) > (1−σ1)k] <∞,
and hence,
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
t=0
lR(t) < σ1k]
=
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
t=0
(1− lR(t)) > (1− σ1)k] <∞. (63)
Similarly, if σ2 = 0, then P[
∑k−1
t=0 lM(t) < σ2k] = 0, and
hence
∑∞
k=1 P[
∑k−1
t=0 lM(t) < σ2k] = 0 < ∞. On the other
hand, if σ2 = σM − ǫ2 > 0, since ǫ > 0, we have σ2 < σM.
Thus, P[
∑k−1
t=0 lM(t) < σ2k] ≤ P[
∑k−1
t=0 lM(t) < σMk]. It
then follows from (57) that
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
t=0
lM(t) < σ2k] ≤
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
t=0
lM(t) < σMk] <∞.
(64)
Finally, (46) follows from (62)–(64).
An attacker that is knowledgeable about the random packet
losses in the network may avoid placing malicious attacks
when random packet losses occur. Proposition 4.6 provides a
range of values of σ such that the inequality (46) holds when
the attacker follows this strategy. Compared to the case where
attacks and random packet losses are independent, this strategy
would increase the overall number of packet exchange failures,
even though the number of attacks may be the same. The
reason is that in the independent case, the attacks and random
packet losses may occasionally happen at the same time,
reducing the total packet failure count. Noe that the range of σ
in Proposition 4.6 is larger than that in Proposition 4.4, where
the attacks and random packet losses are independent, even
though in both results the malicious attacks satisfy (57) with
the same σM ∈ (0, 1). In Section V-B, we discuss and compare
two attack strategies independent/dependent on random packet
losses. Both strategies cause instability for certain feedback
gain and event-triggering mechanism parameters.
It is important to note that particular choices of the con-
troller parameters may result in instability when σ ∈ [0, 1] is
large. If the packet exchange failures are known to happen
statistically frequently, that is, if σ is large, then the feedback
gain K and the event-triggering mechanism parameters β and
P should be redesigned to ensure stability. In such cases,
Theorem 3.5 and Corollary 3.8 can be employed with ρ ≥ σ
that satisfies (4) or (26).
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we present numerical examples to illustrate
our results provided in Sections II–IV.
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Figure 3. Sample paths of the state norm
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A) Example 1: We consider the system (1) with
A ,
[
1 0.1
−0.5 1.1
]
, B ,
[
0.1
1.2
]
.
We use the event-triggering control law (2), (23) for stabi-
lization of (1) over a network that faces independent ran-
dom packet losses and malicious attacks. Specifically, ran-
dom packet losses are assumed to be characterized by the
Markov chain {lR(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 with initial distribution
ϑ0 = 0, ϑ1 = 1, and transition probabilities p0,1(i) ,
0.2 + 0.03 sin2(0.1i), p1,1(i) , 0.2 + 0.03 cos
2(0.1i), and
pq,0(i) = 1 − pq,1(i), q ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N0. Note that
{lR(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 satisfies (6) and (7) with p1 = 0.23 and
p0 = 0.8. Furthermore, the network is subject to jamming
attacks that is independent of {lR(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 and
satisfies (9) with κ = 2 and τ = 5. By Lemma 2.3, (11)
holds with ρM = 0.21 since ρM = 0.21 > 1τ = 0.2.
Furthermore, note that p1 + p0ρM < 0.4. Hence, it follows
from Proposition 2.4 that for ρ = 0.4, (4) of Assumption 2.1
holds, which implies (26) through Lemma 3.2.
We designed the controller based on the procedure in
Section III-B and obtained the matrices
Q =
[
0.618 −2.119
−2.119 28.214
]
, M =
[
0.202 −20.405 ] ,
and scalars β = 0.55, ϕ = 2.4516 satisfy (42), (43), and
(30) with ρ = 0.4. Hence, it follows from Corollary 3.8 that
the event-triggered control law (2), (23) with P = Q−1 and
K = MQ−1 guarantees almost sure asymptotic stabilization.
We generated 250 sample state trajectories using the same
initial condition x0 = [1, 1]T and the event-triggering mech-
anism parameter θ = 1000, but with different sample paths
for lR(·) and lM(·). We can check in Fig. 3 that all state
trajectories go to the origin. The same is true for the Lyapunov-
like function V (x(t)). We show a single sample trajectory of
V (·) in Fig. 4. The Lyapunov-like function V (·) converges
to zero, but notice that it is not monotonically decreasing.
The Lyapunov-like function V (·) increases in two situations.
First, when packet exchange attempts fail, V (·) may grow and
take a larger value at the next packet exchange attempt instant
due to unstable dynamics of the uncontrolled system. Second,
V (·) may also increase some time after a successful packet
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failures (L(k)/k) under malicious attack (65) with τ = 3
exchange between the plant and the controller. This is because
the constant control input updated with the packet exchange
becomes ineffective after some time. Note that eventually a
new packet exchange attempt is triggered before V (·) leaves
the bound identified in the event-triggering condition (23).
B) Example 2: Our goal in this example is to illustrate
effects of different attack strategies discussed in Section IV.
Here, we consider a scalar linear system (1) with A = 2 and
B = 1. Its initial state is set to x0 = 1. Furthermore, the
feedback gain and the event-triggering mechanism parameters
in (2) and (23) are given by K = −1.75, β = 0.0625, P = 1.
We set the packet exchange events to be triggered at all time
instants. This is done with θ = 1 in (23).
The random packet losses in the network are character-
ized by the Markov chain {lR(t) ∈ {0, 1}}t∈N0 with initial
distribution ϑ0 = 0, ϑ1 = 1, and transition probabilities
p0,1(t) , 0.4 + 0.01 cos(0.1t), p1,1(t) , 0.4 + 0.01 sin(0.1t),
and pq,0(t) = 1− pq,1(t), q ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ N0. Note that lR(·)
satisfies (6) and (7) with p1 = 0.41 and p0 = 0.61.
We consider two attack strategies described by (9) and
discuss stability properties of the closed-loop system.
(i) Random-Loss-Independent Attack Strategy: We consider
the strategy given by lM(0) , 0, and
lM(t) ,
{
1, if
∑t−1
i=0 lM(i) ≤ t+1τ − 1,
0, otherwise,
t ∈ N. (65)
Note that (65) satisfies (9) with κ = 0. In this strategy, the at-
tacker uses the total count of all attacks prior to time t to check
whether placing an attack at time t would meet the requirement
in (9) or not. The attacker causes a packet exchange failure
at time t if (9) still holds at time t (i.e., ∑ti=0 lM(i) ≤ t+1τ ).
Under this strategy, attacks are independent of random packet
losses and the attack times become periodic with period τ
when τ is an integer. We will assess stability/instability of the
closed-loop system with two different values of τ .
First, we consider τ = 3, that is, the attacker prevents packet
exchanges once in every 3 steps. In this case the closed-loop
system is stable despite the attack. We use Theorem 3.5 to
show stability as follows. By Lemma 2.3, (11) holds with
ρM = 0.3334 >
1
τ
= 13 . Now, note that p1 + p0ρM < 0.62.
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Figure 7. Sample paths of the average number of packet exchange attempt
failures (L(k)/k) under malicious attack (65) with τ = 2
Since lR(·) and lM(·) are independent, it follows from Propo-
sition 2.4 that (4) in Assumption 2.1 holds for ρ = 0.62, which
implies (26) through Lemma 3.2. Further, (28)–(30) hold with
P = 1, β = 0.0625, and ϕ = 4. By Theorem 3.5, the event-
triggered control law (2), (23) with P = 1, β = 0.0625, and
K = −1.75 guarantees almost sure asymptotic stabilization.
Fig. 5 shows 50 sample trajectories of lnV (x(·)) where
V (x(t)) , x2(t). These trajectories are obtained under mali-
cious attack (65) but with different sample paths for {lR(t) ∈
{0, 1}}t∈N0. Note that all trajectories of lnV (x(·)) approach
−∞, indicating convergence of the state to 0. Moreover, in
Fig. 6, we show sample trajectories of the average number
of packet exchange attempt failures. Observe that the long run
average number of packet failures is small enough to guarantee
stability (lim supk→∞ L(k)k ≤ ρ = 0.62).
Next, we consider (65) with τ = 2, i.e., the malicious
attacker prevents every other packet exchange attempt. With
τ = 2, the closed-loop system becomes unstable. We can
show this through Theorem 4.2 as follows. First, note that
in this case, (65) implies (57) with σM , 0.49. To see this,
we observe that
∑k−1
t=0 lM(t) ≥ kτ − 1 = k2 − 1 for all k ∈ N.
Next, using Markov’s inequality we obtain
P[
k−1∑
t=0
lM(t) < σMk] = P[
k−1∑
t=0
(1− lM(t)) > (1− σM)k]
≤ P[e
∑k−1
t=0 (1−lM(t)) ≥ e(1−σM)k]
≤ e−(1−σM)kE[e
∑k−1
t=0 (1−lM(t))] ≤ e−(1−σM)ke1+ k2 ,
for k ∈ N. Consequently, since σM < 1τ = 12 , we have∑∞
k=1 P[
∑k−1
t=0 lM(t) < σMk] ≤
∑∞
k=1 e
−(1−σM)ke1+
k
2 =
e
1
2+σM(1 − eσM− 12 )−1 < ∞, which implies (57). Now, note
that 1−p0(1−σM) > 0.68. Hence, by Proposition 4.4, we have
(46) for σ = 0.68. Consequently, by Lemma 4.1, (47) holds
for σ = 0.68. Furthermore, inequalities (49)–(51) hold with
Pˆ = 1, βˆ = 0.0625, and ϕˆ = 4. It follows from Theorem 4.2
that the closed-loop system with K = −1.75 is unstable.
This example shows that an attacker can destabilize the
system by reducing τ from 3 to 2 and hence causing higher
number of packet losses on average. As illustrated in Fig. 7,
when τ = 2, in the long run, the average number of packet
failures becomes larger (lim infk→∞ L(k)k ≥ σ = 0.68)
compared to the case with τ = 3 in Fig. 6.
(ii) Selective Attack Strategy: Next, we consider the case
where the attacker is knowledgeable about the random packet
losses in the network. To describe this strategy we let
lM(t) ,
{
1, if lR(t) = 0 and
∑t−1
i=0 lM(i) ≤ t+1τ − 1,
0, otherwise,
(66)
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Figure 8. Sample paths of lnV (x(·)) under malicious attack (66) with τ = 3
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Figure 9. Sample paths of the average number of packet exchange attempt
failures (L(k)/k) under malicious attack (66) with τ = 3
for t ∈ N and lM(0) = 0. This strategy is similar to the one
given by (65) in that it satisfies (9) with i = t and κ = 0.
However, an attacker following (66) utilizes random packet
loss information at time t, by not placing an attack when
lR(t) = 1 (indicating packet failures due to random errors).
To compare, we set τ = 3, under which the first strategy
(65) cannot destabilize the system. From the simulations, we
notice that with τ = 3, the selective attack strategy causes
the system state to diverge (see Fig. 8 for 50 sample paths of
lnV (x(t)) with V (x(t)) , x2(t)). In fact, we observe from
Fig. 9 that (47) holds with σ = 0.7. This σ satisfies condition
(51) of Theorem 4.2, indicating instability.
Next, we consider an extension to the attack model in (66).
In this model, the attacker places attacks whenever lR(t) =
0,
∑t−1
i=0 lM(i) ≤ t+1τ − 1, and lnV (x(t)) ≤ ζ. From the
simulations with ζ = 50 and τ = 3, we see that the state does
not diverge, but the attacker is able to keep it around the level
identified with lnV (x(t)) = ζ (see Fig. 10). We also observe
that in the long run, the average number of packet failures
approaches 23 . We remark that
2
3 is a critical value for this
example in the sense that ρ < 23 in (30) implies convergence
of the state, and σ > 23 in (51) implies divergence.
Finally, we show that by redesigning the feedback gain
K , we can reensure closed-loop system stability. To this end
we set K = −1.9. It follows from Theorem 3.5 that the
event-triggered control law (2), (23) with P = 1, β = 0.01,
guarantees almost sure asymptotic stability of the closed-loop
system. This can be checked as follows. By Lemma 2.3, the
attack strategy (66) and its extension above satisfy (11) with
ρM = 0.3334. Now, note that p1 + ρM < 0.744. Since lR(·)
and lM(·) are not independent, it follows from Proposition 2.5
that (4) of Assumption 2.1 holds for ρ = 0.744, which implies
(26) through Lemma 3.2. Notice that Proposition 2.5 provides
a tight bound (ρ = 0.744) for the average number of packet
exchange attempt failures for the attack strategy (66) (Fig. 9).
Moreover, (28)–(30) hold with P = 1, β = 0.01, and ϕ = 4.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored control of linear dynamical
systems over networks that face random packet losses and
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Figure 10. Sample paths of lnV (x(·)) under state-dependent attacks
malicious attacks. We proposed a probabilistic characteri-
zation of the evolution of the total number of packet ex-
change failures. Based on this characterization, we obtained
sufficient conditions for almost sure asymptotic stabilization
and presented a method for finding a stabilizing feedback
gain and parameters for our proposed event-triggered control
framework. Furthermore, to investigate potential cyber risks
in networked control operations, we studied the problem from
the perspective of an attacker. We obtained conditions under
which combined effects of random and malicious packet losses
can destabilize the closed-loop system.
The framework developed in this paper has been utilized to
investigate the output feedback control problem in [54]. The
probabilistic characterization developed in this paper is utilized
there for modeling random and malicious packet losses in
transmission of the output information from the plant sensors
to the estimator in the controller side.
A direction for future research is to explore the networked
control problem when wireless communication is used. There,
several communication nodes and routers can be involved, and
some of them may be compromised by adversaries. Our pro-
posed network model can be incorporated to describe random
failures and malicious attacks observed in such problems [55].
Furthermore, there are other important issues discussed in the
networked control literature such as system and measurement
noise [20], transmission delays [19], [56], and the modeling of
the communication protocol [19], [45]. Investigation of these
issues within our framework remains as a future work.
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APPENDIX
Lemma A.1 below provides upper bounds on the tail prob-
abilities of sums involving a binary-valued Markov chain.
Lemma A.1: Let {ξ(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 be a time-
inhomogeneous Markov chain with transition probabilities
pq,r : N0 → [0, 1], q, r ∈ {0, 1}. Furthermore, let {χ(i) ∈
{0, 1}}i∈N0 be a binary-valued process that is independent of
{ξ(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0. Assume
pq,1(i) ≤ p˜, q ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N0, (67)
∞∑
k=1
P[
k−1∑
i=0
χ(i) > w˜k] <∞, (68)
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where p˜ ∈ (0, 1), w˜ ∈ (0, 1]. We then have for ρ ∈ (p˜w˜, w˜),
P[
k−1∑
i=0
ξ(i)χ(i) > ρk] ≤ ψk, k ∈ N, (69)
where ψk , σ˜k + φ−ρk+1 ((φ−1)p˜+1)
w˜k−1
(φ−1)p˜ with φ ,
ρ
w˜
(1−p˜)
p˜(1− ρ
w˜
) ,
σ˜k , P[
∑k−1
i=0 χ(i) > w˜k], k ∈ N. Moreover,
∑∞
k=1 ψk <∞.
In the proof of Lemma A.1, by following the approach used
for obtaining Chernoff-type tail distribution inequalities for
sums of independent random variables (see Appendix B of
[57] and Section 1.9 of [58]) we use Markov’s inequality.
Specifically, let y denote the sum of a number of random
variables, and consider the tail probability P[y > ς ], where
ς ∈ R. In obtaining a bound for this tail probability, Markov’s
inequality is utilized to obtain
P[y > ς ] ≤ P[y ≥ ς ] = P[φy ≥ φς ] ≤ φ−ςE[φy ],
for φ > 1. Chernoff bound is then given by minφ>1 φ−ςE[φy].
In the proof of Lemma A.1 we do not provide the details of
the minimization process to obtain φ that gives the optimum
bound. Instead, we show that the tail probability inequality
(69) holds with ψk, k ∈ N, and that
∑∞
k=1 ψk <∞. To obtain
this result, in addition to Markov’s inequality, some additional
key steps (including Lemma A.2 below) are also required due
to the fact that in Lemma A.1 we consider sums of (not
necessarily independent) random variables composed of the
product of states of a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain and
a binary-valued process that satisfy (68).
Lemma A.2: Let {ξ(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 be an Fi-adapted
binary-valued Markov chain with transition probability func-
tions pq,r : N0 → [0, 1], q, r ∈ {0, 1}. Then for all φ > 1,
s ∈ N, and p˜ ∈ [0, 1] such that
pq,1(i) ≤ p˜, q ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N0, (70)
we have
E[φ
∑s
j=1 ξ(ij)] ≤ φ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)s−1 , (71)
where i1, i2, . . . , is ∈ N0 denote indices such that 0 ≤ i1 <
i2 < . . . < is.
Proof: We show by induction. First, for the case s = 1,
E[φ
∑s
j=1 ξ(ij)] = E[φξ(i1)] ≤ φ. (72)
For the case s = 2, the random variable ξ(i1) is Fi2−1-
measurable (because i1 ≤ i2 − 1), and thus we have
E[φ
∑s
j=1 ξ(ij)] = E[φξ(i1)φξ(i2)]
= E[E[φξ(i1)φξ(i2) | Fi2−1]]
= E[φξ(i1)E[φξ(i2) | Fi2−1]]. (73)
Noting that {ξ(i) ∈ {0, 1}}i∈N0 is a Markov chain, we obtain
E[φξ(i2) | Fi2−1] = E[φξ(i2) | ξ(i2 − 1)]. Consequently,
E[φ
∑s
j=1 ξ(ij)] = E[φξ(i1)E[φξ(i2) | ξ(i2 − 1)]]
= E
[
φξ(i1)
(
φP[ξ(i2) = 1 | ξ(i2 − 1)]
+ P[ξ(i2) = 0 | ξ(i2 − 1)]
)]
= E
[
φξ(i1)
(
φP[ξ(i2) = 1 | ξ(i2 − 1)]
+ 1− P[ξ(i2) = 1 | ξ(i2 − 1)]
)]
= E
[
φξ(i1)
(
(φ− 1)P[ξ(i2) = 1 | ξ(i2 − 1)] + 1
)]
. (74)
Then by using (70) and (72), we arrive at
E[φ
∑s
j=1 ξ(ij)] ≤ E
[
φξ(i1)
(
(φ− 1)p˜+ 1
)]
= E[φξ(i1)]((φ − 1)p˜+ 1) ≤ φ((φ − 1)p˜+ 1). (75)
Hence, we have that (71) is satisfied for s ∈ {1, 2}.
Now, suppose that (71) holds for s = s˜ > 2, that is,
E[φ
∑s˜
j=1 ξ(ij)] ≤ φ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)s˜−1 . (76)
We must show that (71) holds for s = s˜+1. Using arguments
similar to those used for obtaining (73)–(75), we obtain
E[φ
∑s˜+1
j=1 ξ(ij)] = E[φ
∑s˜
j=1 ξ(ij)φξ(is˜+1)]
= E[E[φ
∑s˜
j=1 ξ(ij)φξ(is˜+1) | Fis˜+1−1]]
= E[φ
∑s˜
j=1 ξ(ij)E[φξ(is˜+1) | Fis˜+1−1]]
= E[φ
∑s˜
j=1 ξ(ij)E[φξ(is˜+1) | ξ(is˜+1 − 1)]]
≤ E[φ
∑s˜
j=1 ξ(ij)]((φ − 1)p˜+ 1). (77)
Using (76) and (77), we arrive at (71) with s = s˜+ 1.
Proof of Lemma A.1: First, let
ξ(k) , [ξ(0), ξ(1), . . . , ξ(k − 1)]T,
χ(k) , [χ(0), χ(1), . . . , χ(k − 1)]T, k ∈ N.
Now let
Fs,k , {χ ∈ {0, 1}k : χTχ = s}, s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, k ∈ N.
It is clear that Fs1,k ∩ Fs2,k = ∅, s1 6= s2; moreover,
P[χ(k) ∈ ∪ks=0Fs,k] = 1, k ∈ N.
It then follows that for all ρ ∈ (p˜w˜, 1) and k ∈ N,
P[
k−1∑
i=0
ξ(i)χ(i) > ρk] = P[ξ
T
(k)χ(k) > ρk]
=
k∑
s=0
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ(k) > ρk | χ(k) = χ]
· P[χ(k) = χ]. (78)
Due to the mutual independence of ξ(·) and χ(·),
P[ξ
T
(k)χ(k) > ρk | χ(k) = χ] = P[ξT(k)χ > ρk]. (79)
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As a result, it follows from (78) and (79) that for k ∈ N,
P[
k−1∑
i=0
ξ(i)χ(i) > ρk]
=
k∑
s=0
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk]P[χ(k) = χ]
=
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=0
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk]P[χ(k) = χ]
+
k∑
s=⌊w˜k⌋+1
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk]P[χ(k) = χ]. (80)
In the following, we will find upper-bounds for the two
summation terms in (80). First, for the second term, since
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk] ≤ 1, k ∈ N, we have
k∑
s=⌊w˜k⌋+1
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk]P[χ(k) = χ]
≤
k∑
s=⌊w˜k⌋+1
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[χ(k) = χ]
= P[
k−1∑
i=0
χ(i) > w˜k] = σ˜k, k ∈ N. (81)
Next, we look at the first term in (80). Note that P[ξT(k)χ >
ρk] = 0 for χ ∈ F0,k. Hence, for all k ∈ N such that ⌊w˜k⌋ =
0, we have
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=0
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk]P[χ(k) = χ] = 0. (82)
Furthermore, for all k ∈ N such that ⌊w˜k⌋ ≥ 1, we have
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=0
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk]P[χ(k) = χ]
=
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=1
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk]P[χ(k) = χ]. (83)
Now, for s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ⌊w˜k⌋}, let i1(χ), i2(χ), . . . , is(χ)
denote the indices of the nonzero entries of χ ∈ Fs,k such
that i1(χ) < i2(χ) < · · · < is(χ). Consequently,
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk] = P[
s∑
j=1
ξij(χ¯)(k) > ρk]
= P[
s∑
j=1
ξ(ij(χ)− 1) > ρk], (84)
for χ ∈ Fs,k , s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ⌊w˜k⌋}, and k ∈ N such that
⌊w˜k⌋ ≥ 1.
Now note that φ > 1, since ρ ∈ (p˜w˜, w˜). We use Markov’s
inequality to obtain
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk] ≤ P[
s∑
j=1
ξ(ij(χ)− 1) ≥ ρk]
= P[φ
∑s
j=1 ξ(ij(χ)−1) ≥ φρk]
≤ φ−ρkE[φ
∑s
j=1 ξ(ij(χ)−1)]. (85)
It follows from Lemma A.2 that E[φ
∑s
j=1 ξ(ij(χ)−1)] ≤
φ ((φ − 1)p˜+ 1)s−1. Using this inequality together with (83)
and (85), for all k ∈ N such that ⌊w˜k⌋ ≥ 1, we obtain
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=0
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk]P[χ(k) = χ]
≤
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=1
∑
χ∈Fs,k
φ−ρkφ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)s−1 P[χk = χ]
= φ−ρk+1
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=1
((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)s−1
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[χk = χ]
= φ−ρk+1
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=1
((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)s−1 P[χk ∈ Fs,k]
≤ φ−ρk+1
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=1
((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)s−1 , (86)
where we also used the fact that P[χk ∈ Fs,k] ≤ 1 to obtain
the last inequality. Here, we have
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=1
((φ − 1)p˜+ 1)s−1 = ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)
⌊w˜k⌋ − 1
((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)− 1
≤ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)
w˜k − 1
(φ− 1)p˜ . (87)
Hence, (86) and (87) imply
⌊w˜k⌋∑
s=0
∑
χ∈Fs,k
P[ξ
T
(k)χ > ρk]P[χ(k) = χ]
≤ φ−ρk+1 ((φ − 1)p˜+ 1)
w˜k − 1
(φ− 1)p˜ , (88)
for all k ∈ N such that ⌊w˜k⌋ ≥ 1. Because the right-hand
side of this inequality is zero if ⌊w˜k⌋ = 0, (88) holds for all
k ∈ N. Now, this fact together with (80), (81) leads us to (69).
Our next goal is to show
∑∞
k=1 ψk <∞. To this end, first
note that
∞∑
k=1
φ−ρk+1
((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)w˜k − 1
(φ − 1)p˜
=
φ
(φ− 1)p˜
∞∑
k=1
φ−ρk ((φ − 1)p˜+ 1)w˜k
− φ
(φ − 1)p˜
∞∑
k=1
φ−ρk. (89)
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We will show that the series on the far right-hand side of (89)
are both convergent. First, since φ > 1, we have φ−ρ < 1,
and thus, the geometric series
∑∞
k=1 φ
−ρk converges, that is,
∞∑
k=1
φ−ρk <∞. (90)
Next, we show φ−ρ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)w˜ < 1. We obtain
φ−ρ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)w˜ =
(
φ−
ρ
w˜ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)
)w˜
. (91)
Furthermore,
φ−
ρ
w˜ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)
=
( ρ
w˜
(1 − p˜)
p˜(1− ρ
w˜
)
)− ρ
w˜
(( ρ
w˜
(1− p˜)
p˜(1 − ρ
w˜
)
− 1
)
p˜+ 1
)
=
(
p˜w˜
ρ
) ρ
w˜
(
1− p˜
1− ρ
w˜
)− ρ
w˜
(
1− p˜
1− ρ
w˜
)
=
(
p˜w˜
ρ
) ρ
w˜
(
1− p˜
1− ρ
w˜
)1− ρ
w˜
.
Note that p˜w˜
ρ
, 1−p˜1− ρ
w˜
∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞). Since ln v < v − 1 for
any v ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), we have
ln
(
φ−
ρ
w˜ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)
)
=
ρ
w˜
ln
(
p˜w˜
ρ
)
+ (1 − ρ
w˜
) ln
(
1− p˜
1− ρ
w˜
)
<
ρ
w˜
(
p˜w˜
ρ
− 1
)
+ (1 − ρ
w˜
)
(
1− p˜
1− ρ
w˜
− 1
)
= p˜− ρ
w˜
+
p
w˜
− p˜ = 0,
which implies that φ−
ρ
w˜ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1) < 1, and hence by
(91), φ−ρ ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)w˜ < 1. Therefore,
∞∑
k=1
φ−ρk ((φ− 1)p˜+ 1)w˜k <∞. (92)
Finally, (89), (90), and (92) imply ∑∞k=1 ψk <∞. 
